Identity Crisis I
Greetings World,
Today we will look further into the elites “New” System, which they will use to control the world: Digital/Electronic National Identification.
While this is not a new concept, this digital system will hurdle us directly into the global implanted identification chip we have discussed before. So, let us start with the foundation of this system. We already know full well that the elite introduce us to things by way of Problem, Reaction and Solution. The problem is already in this system…More and more countries will be added to the system starting, naturally, with the most heavily populated countries in order that the other countries will have practically no choice. You know, the typical “they have it, we should too” or “I didn’t stand up against it and now I have to use it to get paid, so ok” fools mentality. Thanks to the ignorance of the masses, people will allow their governments to clasp tight the final form of control the elite will need. Under the guise of Unity, more and more individuals will give their fingerprints, DNA, eyes, accounts and all information to their governments, which pool all information internationally together. The ever increasing problems which will come from the insecurity of the system they put in place, will lead successfully to the reaction they long for. The reaction to the problems in this flawed system will be a cry for more security…and the solution will be the “update”, or “upgrade”, the Implanted Chip. National identity gives governments control over its citizens for its national security. Not your security, the governments security. You are and have always been the only liability they have. So today we will start at the beginning of this One system in the making.
The company being used to introduce this system to the world is The Aadhar enabled biometric attendance systems. Aadhar means foundation or base. As we always see with the elite products the symbolism and meaning of words is always relevant. People just don’t ever listen to them.
“Do it quickly, do it quietly, and build a coalition of powerful interests who will overpower any opposition.” -Aadhar Creator Nandan Nilekani
Keywords in the advertising for these systems are: ‘accelerate development’ and ‘eradicate poverty’.
Definitions & Entities in the Aadhar system here.
Modeled after the American Social Security Number (SSN), the Aadhar is a 12-digit unique identification number given to Indian citizens. The difference between the SSN and Aadhar is the use of biometric data (fingerprints and iris scans) for verifying identity. All the way back in Babylon, they had the issue of keeping track of all of the slaves they had in the empire. Their solution was to tattoo or brand the face or back of hands of the slaves. This took place in Babylon, which produced the first code of civil law.
An Aadhar card is not a proof of citizenship, but citizens are required to provide it to receive welfare payments, social services, to do banking, to attend school, to use a phone or device, and companies must be verified by Aadhar to be accepted on bids. This is what they call a Voluntary system, because the law does not directly call it mandatory.
The government does not have to state anything to you outright for it to be reality, they call it voluntary then the government entities bully all others until no company or organization accepts business or gives services without it. Making it mandatory by definition, but voluntary on paper. We have explained how the elite work many many times before, you should know this and see how they do it by now and NOT FEED THE SYSTEM. But you do, and every country and every human being is doomed because of it. Anyone can sign up for and receive an Aadhar card, you DO NOT have to be a citizen of the country.
This makes it very easy for almost anyone, be it Indian or an illegal immigrant, to get an Aadhar Card made without any proof of identity. More importantly, they get an Indian identity. From charges as high as Rs 500 to as low as Rs 2500, ‘Aadhar officers’ have agreed to make Aadhar Cards for applicants, without any proof of identification or proof of address. Of course we must keep in mind these “officers” are morally corrupted and abusive, and encouraged to be so, in the workplace. These same morons have been entrusted to securely collect and send the biometric and demographic data of an individual to UIDAI’s data collection centre in Bangalore, Karnataka! In a nation where simple discarded photocopies of ID proofs have a chance of being used in terrorist acts, one can only imagine how large quantities of personal data like this can be misused. But that is the point.
Aadhar project will furnish each Indian citizen with a unique, 16-digit identification (UID) number representing 12 identity parameters corresponding to the demographic information. This also includes an individual’s fingerprints and iris scan that form a biometric record mapping to the Aadhar number. All data would then be collected and stored in a central database known as CIDR (Central ID Repository).
The Aadhar card makes use of registration machines, which are borrowed from private contractors and NGOs to collect information about the citizens. For those who don’t understand how monumentally absurd this is, there is NO WAY to guarantee that these machines will be wiped clean of the sensitive and private information of its citizens after being used. There is NO WAY of actually recognizing if the data is being taken inside India or outside.
A Personal Data Protection Bill, was introduced in 2013, but naturally, has not been passed by Parliament. When this bill gets passed, all personal information of any citizen, including their political affiliation and sexual preferences would be collected in accordance to the provisions of this Act. The state gets to decide when it is an exceptional case, like an imminent threat or an illegal act, and violate the norms in this act. Like the preventive detention law, authorities can decide what constitutes as a threat to the national security and can obtain information about the person without notifying him/her. Indian citizens, or any citizen of any country, cannot defend themselves in the wake of a loss of privacy. This is, once again, the whole point. This is why the elite have kept you all ignorant of the importance of your privacy and have secretly stripped it all away through social media platforms and all of these “convenient” and “smart” services given to you for FREE. Stupidity is unforgivable.
Judges on the Indian Court’s bench said, “Aadhar gives dignity to the marginalized. Dignity to the marginalized outweighs privacy.”
Since when is “being worthy” better than the concrete, real, sacred, human right to privacy (ie. freedom and independence)? But that is what puts the ELITE in charge over you: by judging if you are worthy. If you have privacy, they can not control or judge you, and that is what they live for. The ignorance of the people we are told to look up to, people in “high places” is breath-taking. This incomprehensible, nonsensical, dribble came from the fat, slimy, mouth of a Judge, an insignificant, narcissistic man, given power to determine the lives of others. In the September 2018 Supreme Court verdict, Aadhar was ruled optional for opening a bank account, but secretly remained mandatory due to its link with the PAN card.
To withdrawl money from bank, one must provide their UID and fingerprints. Unlike a password, (such as the ones used to login to an online banking account) fingerprint comparison is not a binary Yes/No. There is always an element of uncertainty, which is a basic feature of biometric comparison. For example, the system returns two different biometric matching scores for a single user. Based on how one positions the finger, cleanliness of the finger, sensitivity of the system and a myriad of other issues which help to make this system the most unreliable and insecure form of identification. The marriage of internet with biometric data culminates in the death of privacy and human rights. Biometric data itself has been scientifically proven to be ‘inherently fallible’ especially because of constant decay of biological material in human body. Global experience demonstrates that the trust in junk science of biometrics is misplaced. (The stolen biometric passport of a passenger in the missing Malaysian airliner has exposed its claims for good.)
But this is already well known by anyone who opens their eyes, and it is just as “secure” as it was planned to be. Since you don’t do anything about it, let the games continue on. The error rate as Nandan Nilekani indicates, even in the ideal case, is close to 5%. For anyone idiotically thinking, “oh, 5% failure, that’s not bad…” let’s try activating the thought process here. That means the above number would be 5/100 * 1 Billion = 5 Crore incorrectly denied transactions. The situation changes dramatically if the error rate keeps increasing from 5% to 30% as it is observed in states like Telangana. The biometric authentication system is fragile, therefore unstable and insecure. Once again, the elite’s use of this system is, in itself, a huge Lulz for them.
The unique identification (UID) project was promoted as “providing the poor with an identity”. Once again something given by the elites is sold as a noble, pious calling…when in reality its unnecessary, to say the least. Then, it was about de-duplicating the entire Indian population: each person would have one unique number. (After all, “we are one” is the “New Age” BS idea they are selling to condition you into the Hive Mindset of Singularity…once we are all droids after being implanted with the elite’s technology, we will be: as that is what the ‘we are one’ programming is for!!!) THEN the Aadhar system was marketed as if it were to create businesses for private companies, so Section 57 of the Aadhar Act was enacted as a money Bill. Then it became a means of enforcing the cashless economy. Then data as property and the exploitation of the UID number for making people leave detailed digital footprints became the game. Then it became a precondition for undeserved and socioeconomically vulnerable people to get any manner of state assistance. Then, from denial of entitlements if a person is not enrolled or does not seed their number.
It has reached a point where not having a UID number will force you to commit an offense.
Because you want to pay your taxes, but you cannot, because the government will refuse to accept tax payment from you if you do not give them your UID number. And they will cancel your PAN card and then levy a penalty because you do not have a PAN card. Read much more here.
Another false claim from Aadhar is that the the system will help Food Security. Yet another thing Man before elite governments never had to worry about. This world is completely inside out and no one even gets it. One villager said,
“Hey this is my name, but I am not getting my monthly ration that is mentioned here. The dealer is giving me ration in alternative months. How is it possible? My entitlement is linked to Aadhar!”
Other villagers also reacted similarly. The lesson: the system with Aadhar in place is manipulable. BIG SHOCK! In a series of visits made by the volunteers of right to food campaign to the ration shops in Delhi, it was found that nearly 60% of shops are CLOSED and information on the display board about the beneficiary details was not updated.
Internet connectivity issues have led to people’s fingerprints not going through at ration stations in rural India. Similar problems have been faced by people who have suffered injuries to their fingers, while others have faced authentication errors because of glitches or mistakes in the system. If people’s Aadhar biometrics are not being recognized, and Aadhar is then made mandatory for them to get their pensions or even as an ID at a hospital, they’re in trouble. We have already mentioned in our discussions about Quantum Computing and 4 and 5G how internet service will continue to get “worse” for no reason, to push the “better, faster, stronger” 5G system into play. Once again, these agendas always fit together perfectly: this is how it’s done.
Some History about the coming E or “Smart” system of Identity.
- The call for a verifiable registry of citizens got traction in the aftermath of the India-Pakistan Kargil War of 1999.
- 2008, a few “little known” private interests began actively lobbying to take the task of registry building out of the hands of the government, turning it over to a consortium of software companies led by the elites Indian IT Poster-Boy, Nandan Nilekani.
- Multiple judgements and hearings by the Supreme Court of India expressed deep concerns about Aadhar and sought to limit its use.
- The Aadhar lobby dodged all hurdles by exploiting legal loopholes and changing its stated aims and objectives.
- Bitcoin was launched 25 days before UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India) was established on Jan 28, 2009.
- 28 January 2009 The UIDAI was established
- 23 June 2009 Nandan Nilekani, the co-founder of Infosys, was appointed by the then-government, UPA, to head the project.
- By the end of 2009, Aadhar stopped talking about policing and security and reinvented itself as a project that would help make India’s welfare schemes more efficient.
- Top Down Enrolment: In July 2010 UIDAI published a list 15 of agencies which were qualified to provide training to personnel to be involved in the enrolment process. It also published a list of 220 agencies that were qualified to take part in the enrolment process.
- Authentication: On 7 February 2012 the UIDAI launched an online verification system for Aadhar numbers.
- Direct Cash Transfers: On 26 November 2012 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh launched an Aadhar-linked direct benefit transfer scheme.
- In 2016, leveraging the Narendra Modi government, Aadhar was rammed through the Indian parliament. The still private consortium was converted into a statutory body under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology with the name: Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).
- On 11 March 2016 the Aadhar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016, was passed in the Lok Sabha.
- On March 1st 2018 The UIDAI launched the Virtual ID program, and authorized electronic KYC agencies will be required to support Virtual IDs starting June 1st.
The Unique Identification Authority of India has announced a new Virtual ID system that “will allow users to authenticate their Aadhar credentials without the need to share their actual Aadhar numbers.” The system operates in a process similar to the kind of tokenization security used by Visa and Mastercard. The Aadhar project, made authentication based on face recognition mandatory as of September 2018. The fact that UIDAI has introduced virtual ID is in itself as candid an admission of Aadhar’s severe security flaws, exposed by global tech expert Troy Hunt in a recent lengthy write-up. Publicly claimed “tech-savy” Nandan Nilekani, in-charge of UIDAI from the beginning and the chief conceptual brain behind the entire Aadhar project, made the cardinal mistake of publishing his Aadhar details without estimating the consequences of doing so. Consequences…Responsibility…things no one alive today knows anything about.
“Facial recognition will add up to the security layer, the system is foolproof.” says obvious fool Bhushan Pandey UIDAI who doesn’t have 3D face scans of Aadhar users yet.
The new phones (SIM cards) for this service have specific hardware that is used to 3D map a person’s face and only after this data has been captured and stored, is the face unlock feature enabled.
Bangalore, India’s technology capital, is where the UIDAI has its tech headquarters, run by Indian engineers with backgrounds at Google and Intel. Aadhar has signed up with three companies for “refactoring and searching and matching info within the system” led by Accenture, L1, and Morpho with the option of switching among the three at Aadhar’s convenience.
The Aadhar database is currently unmatched in terms of its sheer size and has gone well beyond being a repository of biometrics. It is now an amorphous, leaky, agglomeration of databases that connect names, faces, and prints to their demographic (caste, education, religion, etc.) and financial data (banking details, online purchases, wallet transfer, etc.).
In August 2017, a 31-year-old Android developer named Abhinav Srivastava exploited the Aadhar-linked E-Hospital app. The verification system used in the app did not employ any encryption and Srivastava managed to easily spoof identities and make multiple authentication requests to the main database. That in turn allowed him to verify details on behalf of anyone without their consent or presence, effectively rendering the whole point of unique verification redundant.
On February 25, 2018 Baptiste Robert, another Android developer, was doing a routine SQL injection attack and the portal had responded by spitting out the financial and demographic information of thousands of Indians. Baptiste states,
“I managed to find 5 ways to pwn the official Android app. The password of the local database is the same for everybody,” Baptiste said explaining the app hack. “You can reset the password easily, you can deactivate the password, you can modify the app and get all logs. You can modify the app and bypass the root detection mechanism. The conclusion of my research on the mAadhaar Android app was if I have a physical access to a device with mAadhaar installed I can get all the Aadhaar data stored in it.”
The September 26, 2018 ruling of the Supreme Court on Aadhar:
The UIDAI said in its judgement in the Justice KS Puttaswamy Vs Union of India case, the apex court “upheld the constitutionality of the Aadhar programme”, specifically Section 7 of the Aadhar Act, 2016.
“…Aadhar is used as a means of authentication for availing services, benefits and subsidies. Welfare schemes funded from the consolidated fund of India such as PDS (public distribution system), scholarship, mid-day meals, LPG subsidies, free education, etc, ensure that the Right of Life and Dignity of citizens are being enforced, which includes justice (social, political and economic),” the UIDAI said. There’s the keyword Dignity again…
Dignity surpass the internationally recognized Human Rights.
The Supreme Court, in its judgement on Aadhar, had said it wasn’t mandatory to link Aadhar to bank accounts or mobile numbers and that telecom service providers couldn’t seek Aadhar linking. Other key takeaways from the verdict are: individuals and corporations can’t collect Aadhar data; government can’t give Aadhar to illegal immigrants; Aadhar need not to be made compulsory for school admissions; no person can be denied government benefits only due to absence of Aadhar. However, the Aadhar card is mandatory for PAN linking, Income Tax return, among others.
The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) wrote a letter on October 1, 2018, asking telcos to submit plans to close down their Aadhar-based authentication systems in line with the Supreme Courts order. The biometric authority further warned that if the “authority” did not receive the action plan for the telcos exit of the Aadhar system, within the stipulated timeline, “the authentication services shall be terminated without any further notice”. The UIDAI further said the operators should accept all requests for de-linking the Aadhar from the mobile number and should do fresh KYCs following DoT’s rules within six months from the date of such a request to avoid de-activation of the number. Moreover, the carriers should let subscribers know of the way to delink their Aadhar from the mobile numbers. This letter sent to the private sector carriers including, Bharti AirtelNSE, Vodafone Idea, Reliance Jio, Tata Teleservices,Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd, and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. took them by surprise as their directions come from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). Despite the apex court’s orders, retailers have continued e-verification via Aadhar in the absence of any instructions from telcos. The operators in turn said they were awaiting DoT’s directions on how to implement the enormous task of the order.
While the Education Department claims any government ID card will do, parents say that schools only accept Aadhar cards. BK Basavaraj, Director of the Public Instruction Department states,
“Collection of Aadhar numbers of students in the state was done for SATS. This was done to ensure that students don’t leave the education system and also to measure their academic progress.”
“We are bound to collect it and we have to do it. They (the Public Instruction Department) tell us that it is mandatory and we cannot question them about it. For all entries related to the student, the Department now asks for the Aadhar number of the student – to open student bank accounts, issue examination hall tickets and so on.” says Myrtle Lewis, a school principal from Udupi.
“Any identity system by a government is centralized, which is the source of corruption, inequality, injustice, misery and poverty in a massive scale. ”
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Open in new tab There are three kinds of fraud: identity fraud, eligibility fraud, and quantity fraud.
Aadhar only provides some measure of protection against the first.
In Bhim Block, Rajsamand District, Rajasthan, 1,799 pensioners were declared dead because they failed to open Aadhar-linked bank accounts in time. A campaign conducted by the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sanghatan found that 1,308 of these were actually alive, and had been denied their rightful pensions. Dainik Bhaskar estimates that 1 lakh of Rajasthan’s 2.97 lakh pensioners had been inaccurately declared dead.
There have been over one hundred reported incidents of Aadhar-related fraud already. Much of Aadhar’s branding as a transformational solution to India’s welfare problems relied on incorrect data. Government and businesses are pushing people to submit their UID number for nearly every aspect of their lives, to receive welfare benefits such as pension payments, to file taxes and register marriages, as well as to access mobile phone services and bank accounts. This turns Aadhar into a dangerous bridge (“link“) between these previously isolated databases. By now, more than 80% of India’s mobile phone user base, have linked their Aadhar to their phone number. Everything linked, everything shared, everything available ONLINE.
India’s inefficient, unsecured centralized data system offers a cautionary tale for the rest of the world. Electronic records for citizens can, in theory, improve public services and reduce administrative costs. But as we all know, theories are pointless and mean nothing but a waste of everyone’s time.
Centralized electronic records reduce cost by spending its citizens’ basic rights.
“Basically [the government, phone companies and banks are] completely dependent on the confusion,” Meghnad said, “because people think the program is compulsory, they sign up for it and LINK many of their accounts with it. People panic and they’re like, ‘Oh my, we have to link it now, it’s mandatory.’”
This, sadly is the unfitting and preposterous way of thinking today. Everyone stampeding to whatever lights up next in a panic response, too afraid to disturb the asphyxiated little grey cells they have kept dormant for so long.
mark attendance for government workers, which records names, photos and unique Aadhar numbers, has been numerously and easily compromised. One such event led to the access of private information for at least Jharkhand 166,000 workers. The UIDAI claims that the system is impenetrable, because the data centers are locked behind 5 foot thick walls…
The notion that data is some sort of physical commodity that can be physically safeguarded is a lot like being content with handing over your debit card and PIN to someone, safe in the knowledge that your cash is safely stored in a bank vault. THIS IS A LIE! …but I digress. French hacker Robert Baptiste scraped the site using just 100 lines of Python code. He tweeted about this attack here. The detailed walkthrough of how it is done can be found here. Please, have fun. 😉
In case any of you are still capable of thinking that putting any of your private information online is remotely a good idea, as if it ever was…Here are a few more stories to fix your mentality, and (as usual) prove our point, ad nauseum, far beyond any ability to deny it….as we so love to do.
As if hackers were even needed to exploit the idiot ruling classes, more than 200 central and state government websites have leaked the personal details of users of India’s controversial national ID system, Aadhar.
The personal data of many of India’s citizens is for sale on WhatsApp for less than $10.
Print fake Aadhar cards for just $5 more!
Reliance Jio, which was launched by India’s richest man Mukesh Ambani, reportedly leaked the information of 120 million people online last summer. More recently, Airtel was accused of opening up bank accounts for customers without their consent when gathering Aadhar biometrics to authenticate their mobile phone accounts. Almost $30 million in cooking gas subsidies were diverted into the Airtel accounts as a result.
A New Delhi-based security researcher named Karan Saini discovered a web addressed used by a state-owned utility company that was so unsecured, it gave access to the Aadhar database, and even allowed Saini to query results. The data able to be access includes (but is in No way limited to) banking information, mobile numbers, residential address, date of birth and PAN number, voter ID number, telecom operator, phone model and much much more. The associated banking information is in direct contradiction to the claims by UIDAI and Union minister Ravi Shankar Prasad that Aadhar does not have any information on bank accounts. (and ANY other provider which uses this system) has access to the Aadhar database through an API, which the company relies on to check a customer’s status and verify their identity. But because the company hadn’t secured the API, it is possible to retrieve private data on each Aadhar holder, regardless of whether they’re a customer of the utility provider or not.
Learn how you can access the API that Aadhar provides to third party services, and thereby every Aadhar users information, here.
A reporter with India’s Tribune newspaper managed to purchase personal information leaked from the Aadhar database from a broker for just 500 rupees ($7).
“Any compromise of such a database is essentially irreversible for a whole human lifetime. No one can change their genetic data or fingerprints in response to a leak.”
-lawyer Mishi Choudhary for the BBC.
Aadhar Users Information can be found on Google. A quick online search will verify this, revealing Aadhar user information on several websites including the-aiff.com (official website of All India Football Federation), and Starcards India, a private payment gateway service provider. Multiple news reports also suggested that by just typing ‘Mera Aadhar, Meri Pehchan’, which is UIDAI’s tagline, on Google, the search opens several PDF files containing Aadhar information like name, parents name, address, Aadhar number, picture, and even date of birth. This is what we call doxxing: stripping someone of their privacy and exposing them to the world.
For those of you who only believe it “if the government tells you”, or “if Snowden says”, you’re in luck. The government shill Eddy Snowman has put his two cents out there for you all. The same speech he has given many times now. You don’t listen anyway.
Join us next time as we look further into Aadhar, and its “creator” Nandan Nilekani, his connections and involvements. He will be the link to bring India into a NWO under one digital currency, UNIFYING us all as other countries follow in suit. India is the baited hook. Nandan is the link between the tech side and the political side: the elite poster boy we have seen so many times before. But we don’t want to give away all of our fun stories in one letter.